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On July 12th, 2017, internet consumers rallied the support of more than 
125,000 websites, internet users, and web-based companies to protest against the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) plan to jettison protections against 
data throttling, blocking, and extra fees.
1
  In this “Net Neutrality Day of Action,” 
protesters demonstrated in Washington, D.C., posted YouTube videos, called 
Congressional representatives, and engaged in various other efforts to fight for 
continued regulations that ensure net neutrality.
2
  In these efforts, protestors sent 
over 5,000,000 emails to Congress, posted over 2,000,000 comments through the 
FCC’s webpage, and made over 120,000 calls to Congress to express 
dissatisfaction with the FCC’s wavering support of net neutrality regulations.
3
 
These protests were not the public’s first attempt to rally support for net 
neutrality regulations.
4
  In June 2014, John Oliver addressed net neutrality on his 
weekly talk show Last Week Tonight.  This episode provoked such an enormous 
response that the FCC’s website servers overloaded, going offline for hours, as 
millions of comments flooded the website.
5
 
Internet consumers are not alone in opposing relaxed net neutrality 
regulations; the corporate world has pushed back as well.  In 2014, Twitter, 
Netflix, and Upworthy, along with many others, took place in an “Internet 
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Slowdown” protest where websites posted banners with the “loading” symbol on 
their homepages to raise awareness of the need for strong net neutrality 
regulations.
6
  When President Trump discussed his plan to cut back on these 
regulations in 2017, corporations—this time in much larger numbers than 2014—
held another day of protest.  On July 12th, 2017, over 170 internet services, 
including Google, Amazon, and Pornhub, throttled their internet-based services in 
protest of the possible abandonment of net neutrality regulation.
7
 
These protests were not isolated incidents: throughout the past decade, there 
have been numerous protests as commentators hotly debate the topic of net 
neutrality.
8
  Generally, internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as Verizon, favor 
deregulation of the market, while consumers, application designers, and web-
based service providers, such as Amazon, Netflix, and Hulu, heavily support 
robust regulation that protects net neutrality.
9
 
As the topic of net neutrality becomes increasingly polarized, the question 
becomes: Who should decide how consumers use the internet?  Are usage 
determinations best left unregulated and to the discretion of massive corporations, 
or should usage be determined by regulations that aim to ensure an open and freely 
accessible internet?  The answer to this question has far-reaching and deeply 
meaningful implications for the lives of every American.
10
 
The ways in which consumers communicate, access information, and 
participate in social media are all subject to change as the future of net neutrality 
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‘Net Neutrality,’ METRO UK (July 11, 2017), http://metro.co.uk/2017/07/11/the-Internet-is-slowing-
down-tomorrow-to-protest-trumps-attack-on-net-neutrality. 
 8 See Another Debate About Net Neutrality in America, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21721245-new-head-fcc-will-roll-back-obama-era-rules-
another-debate-about-net-neutrality; Richard John, The Next Net Neutrality Debate, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (July 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-10/the-next-net-neutrality-
debate; Kif Leswing, ‘No Paid Fast Lanes,’ BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2017) 
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regulation becomes uncertain.
11
  Part I of this Essay will discuss the technical 
background of this debate.  Part II will discuss the legal background and explain 
the FCC’s jurisdiction to regulate net neutrality.  Part III will explain and analyze 
the current policy debate over net neutrality regulation and discuss why the Trump 
administration’s stance on net neutrality is misguided.  With the Trump 
administration’s new goals of light-handed net neutrality regulation, 
understanding this debate and the consequences of its conclusion are more 
important than ever. 
I.     TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will discuss the historical and technical background of the internet, 
starting with the rise of broadband.  Then, this Part will explain how data is 
transferred to and between consumers.  Lastly, this Part will discuss the general 
structure of the internet and its relevance to the net neutrality debate. 
A.   Net Neutrality and the Rise of Broadband 
“Net neutrality” refers to an internet regime in which broadband ISPs charge 
consumers only once for internet access.
12
  Under a net neutral system, ISPs cannot 
favor one content provider over another, meaning they cannot slow down content 
from or provide faster access to predetermined sources.
13
  Moreover, ISPs do not 
charge content providers for sending their information and content over broadband 
lines to end users.
14
  Before discussing the merits of operating under a net neutral 
internet system, understanding how the creation of broadband internet service 
gave rise to the current debate is imperative. 
The advent of broadband vastly changed how consumers accessed and used 
the internet.
15
  Before the late 1990s, the majority of internet consumers gained 
internet access through a “dial-up” connection.
16
  Traditional telephone networks 
forged dial-up connections between users and servers.
17
  Under this connection 
model, independent ISPs, such as AOL, linked internet consumers’ telephone 
networks with the internet.
18
  
The process for an internet consumer to connect to the internet before the 
1990s was as follows: First, the user would call a telephone number associated 
with their ISP’s facilities, then the telephone company would route that user’s call 
through its circuit-switched network as the call traveled to the ISP’s facility.
19
  
Next, the ISP at the receiving end of the exchange provided the protocol 
 
 11 See id. 
 12 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 614 (4th ed. 2015). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional 
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 25 (2009). 
 16 Id. at 24. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
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conversion functions needed for communication to occur between the consumer’s 
computer and the internet applications and content providers.
20
  This process was 
very similar to the process telephone companies used as common carriers to route 
calls to various ISP modem banks.
21
 
In the late 1990s, consumers gained the ability to use local cable companies’ 
facilities with affiliated ISPs to bypass the aforementioned traditional circuit-
switching connection.
22
  This new bypassing process created much faster internet 
access than dial-up previously had.
23
  With this evolution into faster internet 
connection came a key policy debate: whether requirements to open cable 
operators’ broadband transmission networks, which provided high-speed internet 
access to unaffiliated ISPs, were appropriate.
24
  Such regulations would operate in 
the same way as those which required telephone companies to open lines 
throughout the telecommunications industry.
25
  
As scholars drew parallels between broadband transmission and the right to 
share web content, this policy debate eventually transformed into the concept of 
net neutrality.
26
  While original open access proposals suggested granting ISPs 
rights of “nondiscriminatory” access to the broadband transmission platform, net 




By the early 2000s, the internet was significantly changed, once again, by 
the advent of broadband internet and the ability to split signals.
28
  The term 
broadband “refers to high-speed Internet access that is always on and faster than 
the traditional dial-up access.”
29
  “Splitting signals” includes dividing the signal 
from one line between the telephone service and internet access.  This process 
allowed users to simultaneously connect to the internet and make phone calls.
30
  
Broadband allowed consumers to download content at greater speeds than ever 
before, paving the way for new types of websites such as YouTube and Netflix 
that were not feasible under the old structure’s connection speed.
31
 
As consumers used this new technology more frequently, the price of 
internet-related services began to drop, allowing more consumers to use broadband 
internet services, causing increased ISP competition.
32
  Therefore, in the early 
2000s, it was common for ISPs to offer customers amenities such as faster 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 24–25. 
 23 Id. at 25. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 26. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Broadband History, USWITCH, 
https://www.uswitch.com/broadband/guides/broadband_history (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
 29 Types of Broadband Connections, FED. COMM. COMM’N, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/types- broadband-connections (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
 30 Broadband History, supra note 28.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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broadband, heavy use broadband, and broadband bundles.
33
  Today, nearly 




B.   Internet Protocol Networks 
Understanding how the internet operates and is structured is integral in fully 
grasping the net neutrality debate.  This Section explains the internet protocol and 
the process through which data is transferred over the internet to end users. 
The internet “is not a unitary, centrally managed network, but an 
interconnected set of many thousands of constituent networks.”
35
  These thousands 
of networks are joined together through a “voluntarily adopted . . . common 
protocol and addressing scheme” known as the internet protocol (IP).
36
  IP 
addressing enables “its end users to communicate with end users connected to 
other networks for purposes of exchanging . . . content.”
37
  Within the process of 
exchanging content, the main purpose of an IP addressing system is creating a 
structured process for tagging datagrams with destination address data during 
encapsulation.
38
  Encapsulation occurs when tags that consist of data, including an 
IP address’s information, are placed within a datagram before the sender transfers 
it to the receiver’s device.
39
  The IP addressing process can be analogized to the 
“U.S. Postal System in that it allows a package (a datagram) to be addressed 
(encapsulation) and put into the system (the Internet) by the sender (source 
host).”
40
  Notice that during this process there is no direct link between sender and 
receiver; the ISP creates the connection between the two users.
41
 
This process is key to net neutrality for the following reason: when an 
internet user requests information from a website—for example, the user wants to 
see a picture on Instagram—the Instagram server divides the requested picture into 
small data packets, which includes the requesting user’s IP as the destination 
address.
42
  By using their individual IP, the picture data packets are transmitted to 
the requesting consumer.
43
  Data packets may take different routes to get to the 
requesting user and may be received in various orders before the receiving system 
assembles and displays it.
44
  This process would be impossible without the help of 
ISPs: “While the content providers build big web-servers to make their content 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Nuechterlein, supra note 15, at 22. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Internet Protocol (IP), TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5366/Internet-
protocol-ip (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Ravi Kiran, Net Neutrality Debate—I, MONEYLIFE (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.moneylife.in/article/net-neutrality-debate-i/41098.html (using Facebook as an example 
for this process). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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available, it is ISPs[’] . . . equipment[] which carry the data packets to [users’] 
home machines as and when requested.”
45
  Therefore, at a basic level, there are 
three key participants in the internet industry: ISPs, applications and content 
operating companies, and consumers/end users.
46
 
C.   The Structure of the Internet 
In addition to understanding the process by which ISPs transmit content to 
internet consumers, one must understand a basic structural aspect of the internet: 
constituent network structures.  Recall that thousands of constituent networks 
make up the internet.
47
  In general, there are three broad classifications of 




All computers that are connected to the internet are linked to a network 
supplied by an ISP.
49
  When consumers want an internet connection, they must 
join their ISP’s network to obtain internet access where they are then connected to 
a larger network.
50
  Therefore, in a sense, the internet is a meganetwork comprised 
of various smaller constituent networks.
51
 
The first type of constituent network is an internet backbone network.
52
  
Internet backbone networks are those that deliver data and content to and from 
internet consumers.
53
  Keeping in mind that the internet is made up of various 
interconnected networks, it is likely that this delivered data has traveled from 
internet users that are part of a different internet backbone network than the final 
consumer’s internet backbone.
54
  Accordingly, all internet backbone networks 
must be interconnected if data is to be effectively transmitted to consumers.
55
  
Today, many telecommunications companies operate their own high-capacity 
backbones to connect customers in various geographic regions.
56
  These 
companies each have a point of presence, which is a “place for local users to access 
the company’s network.”
57
  Points of presence are located in the different regions 
in which ISPs connect their customers; therefore, under this model of 
interconnection, there is no singular overarching network in control.
58
  “Instead, 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Nuechterlein, supra note 15, at 22. 
 48 Id. at 23. 
 49 Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
https://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-infrastructure.htm (last visited Mar. 
15, 2019). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (describing the internet as a “network of networks”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See id. at 56. 
 57 Tyson, supra note 49. 
 58 Id. 
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there are several high-level networks connecting to each other through Network 
Access Points . . . .”
59
   
At the present time, internet backbone providers (“IBPs”) are not regulated 
by any industry-specific rules; therefore, interconnections between backbones and 
the transmission of data from IBPs are largely unregulated.
60
  As opposed to other 
network services, which have their interconnection processes regulated, IBPs 
engage in unofficial self-governance guided by common-law principles.
61
  IBPs 
often enter into deals through informal methods, such as handshake agreements.  
These negotiations are commonly related to two categories of agreements between 
IBPs: peering arrangements and transit agreements.
62
  In peering arrangements, 
providers’ backbone networks transmit and exchange content with one another 
without charging any additional fee.
63
  Conversely, a transit agreement is one in 
which a backbone network will bear the cost of interconnecting and sharing data 
with another.
64
   
Some politicians have called these unregulated practices into question, 
arguing that “providers are able to gain or exploit market power through the terms 
of interconnection that they offer to smaller existing and new backbone 
providers.”
65
  Others have argued that this unregulated system fosters competition 
as IBPs attempt to distinguish themselves through special offerings of new 
services or better prices.
66
  Regardless of where one falls in this debate, it cannot 
be disputed that the strength of market forces will determine the level of 
competition in the future market and shape the landscape of this unregulated 
frontier.
67
   
The second type of constituent networks are network access points 
(“NAPs”).
68
  Although most large businesses have the capability to contract 
directly with an internet backbone network provider, individual end users must 
rely on NAPs to bridge the gap between them and the internet backbone network.
69
  
NAPs are a critical component of the internet because user traffic is routed through 




In its early stages, the commercial development of NAPs was quick, making 
this type of network an additional carrier-neutral service from data center 
 
 59 Id.  Network access points are points where ISPs can connect with one another through 
the transfer of data packets across different networks.  See Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work?, 
POMEROY IT SOLUTIONS (2002), https://web.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/www-
spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm. 
 60 Kende, supra note 53, at 45. 
 61 Id. at 45, 48. 
 62 Id. at 45. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 45–46. 
 68 Id. at 48. 
 69 Cf. NAP, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/N/NAP.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2019). 
 70 Id. 
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providers.
71
  However, this commercial development has begun to slow down, due 
to a recent concentration of data markets caused by public ISPs’ ever-increasing 
use of private modes of interconnection.
72
  This trend has caused NAPs to lose 
importance, which may lead to anticompetitive behavior.  Since most residential 
consumers and small companies rely on high-speed broadband access, the level of 
competition in the broadband marketplace has become a key controversy in the 
net neutrality debate.
73
  Without sufficient competition, end users could suffer 
from slowed speeds of interconnection.
74
   
The last category of constituent networks is the edge network, which can be 
broken down into two categories: end-user networks (home Wi-Fi and corporate 
local area networks) and networks of internet-based service companies.
75
  Edge 
networks are facilities that “quite literally extend the ‘edge’ of the internet [and 
are] further from the traditional internet hubs in places like New York.”
76
  
Traditionally, edge providers were smaller business owners who ran startup 
companies from small servers.
77
  Today, edge networks have become much more 
sophisticated, with some operating large “server farms” and caching facilities.
78
  
Large edge networks are referred to as overlay networks; they mimic internet 
backbone networks’ global reach by caching (storing duplicates of web content 
onto servers located throughout the internet).
79
  Caching bypasses points of traffic 
congestion, providing faster, more reliable internet access.
80
  Some 
megacompanies, such as Google, have built their own overlay networks; however, 
the average content provider will still rely on third-party providers.
81
  Overlay 
systems threaten the premise of net neutrality: corporations that can afford the high 
cost of building an overlay system have an enormous advantage over others who 
still use third-party providers because their consumers “receive faster and more 
reliable access to applications and content.”
82
  
With this technical background in mind, it is easy to understand the 
underlying concept of net neutrality: ISPs connect internet users to internet content 




 71 Kende, supra note 53, at 58. 
 72 Id. at 50. 
 73 See Emma N. Cano, Note, Saving the Internet: Why Regulating Broadband Providers Can 
Keep the Internet Open, 2016 BYU L. REV. 711, 721. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Nuechterlein, supra note 15, at 23–24. 
 76 Yevgeniy Sverdlik, How Edge Data Center Providers Are Changing the Internet’s 
Geography, DATACENTER KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2015/08/26/how-edge-data-center-providers-are-
changing-the-internets-geography. 
 77 See Nuechterlein, supra note 15, at 23. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 23–24. 
 81 Id. at 24. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi, General Introduction: Towards a Multistakeholder 
Approach to Network Neutrality, in NET NEUTRALITY COMPENDIUM: HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE 
COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 1, 3–5 (Luca Belli & Primavera De Filippi eds., 
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Furthermore, a net neutral system would prevent ISPs from blocking content, 
would prevent pricing schemes which charge disparate prices for transmitting data 
of different types, and would preclude ISPs from creating a tiered system in which 
there are different “lanes” consisting of different transmission speeds.
84
 
II.     REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
The technical background of net neutrality is only half of the story; net 
neutrality’s regulatory background is also paramount in this debate.  This Part 
discusses the early regulatory background of net neutrality, the significant actions 
taken by the FCC in 2005, the judiciary’s response to the FCC’s actions, the FCC’s 
classification of broadband under its 2015 Order, and the FCC’s regulatory 
jurisdiction over net neutrality.  
A.   Early History 
The concept of net neutrality has carried over from the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, which mandated the application of common carrier regulations on all 
telecommunications service providers.
85
  These mandatory regulations included 
“rate, nondiscrimination, interconnection, and universal service obligations.”
86
  
The Act aimed to remove competition barriers while laying the foundation for the 
FCC’s regulatory scheme.
87
  As technology developed, the underlying principles 
of the Act shaped justifications for a regulatory scheme that promotes broadband 
regulation and an open-access internet.
88
 
In the late 1990s, the FCC was charged with answering how broadband 
should be classified under the current regulatory regime.
89
  At the time this 
question surfaced, the FCC Chairman suggested that the FCC should apply 
different regulations to broadband than were applied to the telephone industry and 
advocated for light-handed regulation.
90
  However, this approach changed in 2002 




2016).  See generally Michel Kerf & Damien Geradin, Controlling Market Power in 
Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation: An Assessment of the United States, 
New Zealand and Australian Experiences, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 919 (1999). 
 84 See Belli & De Filippi, supra note 83, at 3–5 (discussing ways in which ISPs must not 
discriminate against customers on a country-by-country basis). 
 85 Jennifer Wong, Comment, Net Neutrality: Preparing for the Future, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 669, 679–80 (2011). 
 86 Id. 
 87 An Interview with William E. Kennard, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Oct.–Nov. 1998, at 
1; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 88 Wong, supra note 85, at 680–82. 
 89 See Marguerite Reardon, Net Neutrality: How We Got from There to Here, CNET (Feb. 
24, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/net-neutrality-from-there-to-here/.  
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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FCC Chairman Powell stimulated the net neutrality debate in 2002 by 
classifying broadband as an information service under Title I of the Act.
92
  The 
Chairman found that Title II
93
 and Title VI classifications were incompatible with 
new technology.
94
  Under Title II and Title VI of the Act, two categories of entities 
were defined: telecommunications service providers and cable service providers.
95
  
Telecommunications service providers offer telecommunications to the public for 
a fee and engage in minimal alteration of the information supplied.
96
  Conversely, 
cable services engage in one-way transmission of video or other programming.
97
  
Importantly, Title II of the Act requires common carrier regulation of 
telecommunications service providers.
98
  The FCC’s choice to classify cable 
internet as an information service brought the internet outside of mandatory 
common carrier regulations, creating a regulatory environment in which the FCC 
only had ancillary jurisdiction to regulate.
99
  Overall, the FCC’s new classification 
of cable broadband meant it was not subject to common carrier rules, and that the 
FCC would have restricted jurisdiction in regulating broadband, causing the FCC 
various problems in the future.
100
   
In 2004, Chairman Powell called attention to consumer rights that would be 
at stake without common carrier regulations on broadband in a speech named 
“Four Internet Freedoms.”
101
  In this speech, Chairman Powell defined “four 
freedoms consumers had come to expect from their ISPs”—to access content, to 
run applications, to attach devices, and to obtain service plan information.
102
  The 
influence of this speech was far reaching and soon became an unofficial campaign 
motto for net neutrality advocates across the United States.
103
  
B.   2005 Developments 
The year 2005 was significant for the broadband community for three 
reasons.  First, Chairman Powell’s successor increased public attention to the net 
neutrality debate with the release of the 2005 policy statement.
104
  This policy 
statement announced that the FCC would include four main principles—revamped 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 See generally Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 67 Fed. Reg. 18907 (Apr. 17, 2002).  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
 97 Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 689 (2001); see also 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(A) (2012). 
 98 Cano, supra note 73, at 714. 
 99 Id. at 715–16. 
 100 Reardon, supra note 89; see also Matthew J. Razzano, Comcast-NBCU, Netflix, and the 
FCC: The Dual Merger Review Process as a House of Cards, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 
63, 78–79 (2018). 
 101 See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1460; Reardon, supra note 89. 
 102 Ohm, supra note 101, at 1460–61, 1461 n.229. 
 103 See id. at 1460. 
 104 Id. at 1461. 
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versions of the four freedoms—into ongoing policymaking ventures.
105
  These four 
principles were: 
• To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.   
• To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to 
the needs of law enforcement.   
• To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network.   
• To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to competition among network providers, application and 
service providers, and content providers.
106
 
Significantly, the Commission noted that “[t]he principles we adopt are 
subject to reasonable network management.”
107
  The concept of “reasonable” 
network management has given the FCC a “line in the sand beyond which 
regulators need not defer to business judgment and technological decision 
making.”
108
  However, this line is not as clear as the Chairman would have the public 
believe, and the definition of “reasonable” has prompted much debate, blurring the 
meaning of the standard.
109
   
Second, broadband services saw a legitimization of the FCC’s 2002 
reclassification of broadband through the landmark case National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services.
110
  In this case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s classification of broadband internet as an 
information service, thereby subjecting it to less stringent regulations under Title 
I of the Act and bringing it within the ancillary jurisdiction of the FCC.
111
 
Lastly, in 2005, the FCC engaged in its first attempt to enforce net 
neutrality
112
 when it ordered Madison River Communications to stop blocking 
voice over internet protocols and fined the company $15,000.
113
  With this action, 
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the FCC demonstrated its determination to move away from light-handed 
regulation into a more hands-on regulatory approach. 
C.   Limits on FCC Authority  
In 2008, the FCC received a formal complaint alleging that Comcast was 
suppressing its customers’ use of the application BitTorrent.
114
  Initially, Comcast 
denied these claims, but later admitted to degrading its customers’ connection and 
challenged the FCC’s authority to act.
115
  This complaint brought the FCC’s policy 
of antiblocking to the forefront of telecommunications regulation.
116
  In response, 
the FCC issued an order asserting its jurisdiction over Comcast and censured 
Comcast for degrading BitTorrent, stating that degradation of this kind was unlawful 
unless it “further[s] a critically important interest and [is] narrowly or carefully 
tailored to serve that interest.”
117
  Moreover, the FCC concluded that the type of 
“network management” Comcast was engaging in did not pass muster under the 
appropriate scrutiny; therefore, Comcast had violated the FCC’s policy statement, 
as well as the overarching purpose of the Act.
118
  The FCC issued an order that 
prohibited Comcast’s discrimination against BitTorrent.
119
   
In 2008, Comcast appealed the FCC’s order, challenging the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.
120
  When brought before the D.C. Circuit, the case invovled “whether 
it is ‘reasonable’ for a broadband provider . . . to treat the use of certain lawful 
applications . . . as a proxy for undue consumption of finite and shared network 
resources and thus limit the bandwidth consumed by those applications.”
121
  Net 
neutrality advocates, backed by the FCC, argued that network providers should not 




In 2010, the D.C. Circuit “held that the FCC did not have regulatory or 
ancillary authority over [Comcast].”
123
  This marked an important decision by the 
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After the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion, the chairman of the Commission, 
Genachowski, announced a “[t]hird [w]ay” to classify broadband under the Act: 
classifying the transmission component of broadband service as a 
telecommunications service.
125
  Genachowski explained that the “[t]wo primary 
options [that] have been debated since the Comcast decision” are (1) continuing 
to rely on Title I ancillary authority, and (2) reclassifying internet communications 
as a telecommunications service, whereby the FCC would gain direct authority to 
regulate the internet under Title II of the Act.
126
  Genachowski worried the first 
option “would have a high risk of failure in court” and feared the second 
classification “would impose regulations too extensive to be conducive to the 
current broadband scene.”
127
  Genachowski argued that the third way allowed the 
FCC the power to “recognize the transmission component of broadband as a Title 
II telecommunications service . . . and renounce several sections of the 
Communications Act of 1934 as unnecessary or inappropriate to broadband and 
put in place boundaries to ‘guard against regulatory overreach.’”
128
  
Notwithstanding the Genachowski’s proposal, the FCC decided to move forward 
with net neutrality regulations under its Title I ancillary powers.
129
  
While Comcast was pending in 2009, the FCC expanded upon its four 
principles by adding two more: a nondiscrimination principle and a transparency 
principle.
130
  The nondiscrimination principle required ISPs to manage content and 
applications without discriminating.
131
  The second new principle required ISPs to 
disclose all of their policies to their customers.
132
  After strong pushback from 
ISPs, the FCC also announced several exceptions to the preexisting principles.
133
  
These exceptions stipulated that an ISP’s actions amount to reasonable network 
management if taken to mitigate congestion on networks, address harmful traffic, 




After unsuccessfully asserting authority over Comcast, the FCC announced 
an Open Internet Order in 2010, issuing three new requirements for broadband 
ISPs: nondiscrimination, transparency, and antiblocking requirements.
135
  Verizon 
challenged the FCC’s authority, arguing that (1) the FCC lacked affirmative 
statutory authority needed, (2) the rules were arbitrary and capricious, and (3) the 
rules “contravene statutory provisions prohibiting the Commission from treating 
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broadband providers as common carriers.”
136
  The D.C Circuit held that the FCC 
had statutory authority to regulate broadband providers and to take immediate 
action to deploy internet access, remove barriers, and promote competition.
137
  The 
court also held that the FCC had violated the statute when it regulated broadband 
providers as “common carriers” despite declining to classify them as such.
138
  
Therefore, the court struck down the FCC’s nondiscrimination and antiblocking 
rules, and upheld the transparency rule.
139
  The court also suggested that the FCC 
could “regulate broadband providers in order to achieve its goals of maintaining 
an open Internet and deploying Internet service to all Americans, so long as the 
FCC regulate[d] within its statutory authority.”
140
  Although the FCC lost, the case 




D.   Reclassifying Broadband 
After the Verizon decision, the FCC went back to the drawing board to create 
rules consistent with its net neutrality regulatory goals and statutory authority.
142
  
In 2015, the FCC released a new Open Internet Order which contained three 
actions.  First, the FCC recategorized broadband as a telecommunications service, 
bringing it under Title II of the Act and thereby subjecting it to common carrier 
regulations.
143
  “Second, the FCC exercised its statutory authority to forebear 
extensively from applying twenty-seven provisions of Title II of the 
Communications Act . . . .”
144
  In exercising this authority, the FCC forbore 
section 251 and  252 of Title II from applying.
145
  This meant that local exchange 
carriers were not required to provide competitors with access to network elements 
on an unbundled basis.
146
  Lastly, the FCC promulgated three bright-line rules 
(prohibiting blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization) and one general-conduct 
rule which banned internet broadband providers from  
unreasonably interfer[ing] with . . . (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use 
broadband Internet access service or . . . content, applications, prohibits 
broadband providers from services, or devices . . . or (ii) edge providers’ ability 
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Multiple broadband providers challenged the FCC, arguing that the 
Commission did not have the statutory authority to reclassify broadband, that the 
reclassification was arbitrary and capricious, and that the forbearance from 
provisions of Title II was unlawful.
148
  
The D.C. Circuit upheld the entire FCC order, finding that the Commission 
had good reason for the reclassification, as it was premised on “consumer 
perception of the broadband providers’ services as a standalone offering[] of 
telecommunications service.”
149
  Furthermore, the court upheld the Commission’s 
regulation of interconnection arrangements under Title II, finding it was necessary 
to ensure that broadband providers do not advantage their own interests at the 
expense of edge providers or end users.
150
  Lastly, the court found that the FCC 
did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in forbearing from Title II provisions.
151
  
E.   FCC Jurisdiction 
Although the most recent D.C. Circuit case against the FCC upheld the 
Commission’s Order and accepted its jurisdictional reasoning and broadband 
reclassification, jurisdictional issues still lurk in the background of the net 
neutrality debate.
152
  This Section will analyze the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction 
over net neutrality.  
Over the past decade, nearly all of the Commission’s orders have been met 
with pushback from broadband service providers, creating much litigation over the 
FCC’s authority to regulate broadband.
153
  Furthermore, many cases in which 
courts have addressed the FCC’s jurisdictional authority have been split decisions, 
with strong dissenting opinions.
154
   
The FCC has had the ability to regulate interstate communications since the 
Act granted it the power to regulate communications between wire and radio.
155
  
As discussed above, the Act gave the Commission regulatory authority over 
telecommunications providers and information service providers, found 
respectively in Title II and Title I of the Act.
156
  Title II provided the Commission 
“authority to forbear from enforcing provisions of the Act as well as its own 
regulations.”
157
  Furthermore, Title II of the Act imposed common carrier 
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regulations on telecommunications providers.
158
  In contrast, Title I only provided 
the FCC with ancillary jurisdiction over information service providers.
159
   
Most debates over the FCC’s jurisdiction stem from the enforceability of the 
2015 Order and whether the Commission had the power to reclassify broadband 
as a telecommunications service, thereby bringing broadband services under Title 
II authority and imposing common carrier obligations on these service 
providers.
160
  The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission’s authority in 2016 and 
again in 2017, and the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in an appeal by 
the ISPs.
161
  Furthermore, the new FCC Commissioner, Ajit Pai, stated that he does 




While the future jurisdiction of the FCC is uncertain and continues to incite 
much debate, this Essay will assume arguendo that the Commission’s Title II 
authority is proper and that they are operating under this authority.  
III.     THE NEED FOR CONTINUED NET NEUTRALITY REGULATION 
Although there is fierce debate over net neutrality, both sides acknowledge 
the merits of operating under a net neutral internet.  Since the majority of the 
United States and many internet service-based companies support net neutrality, 
this Essay will not address arguments for or against having an internet that is net 
neutral.
163
  Instead, this Essay addresses the debate over whether the internet needs 
regulation to maintain net neutrality.
164
  
This Part discusses the debate over broadband regulation and offers four 
arguments to demonstrate the need for continued regulation.  Then, this Part will 
discuss the future of the internet without continued regulations.  Lastly, this Part 
will offer two possible changes to the FCC’s 2015 Order that would maximize its 
regulatory effectiveness.  
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A.   The Regulation Debate 
It is challenging to effectively argue that the internet is not a basic human 
need.
165
  Americans are accessing the internet every day.  Whether they are 
checking the weather, responding to emails, sending texts, or browsing social 
media, Americans are constantly using the internet or broadband services.  
Students and professionals of all ages require the internet to complete their day-
to-day tasks and to communicate with others.  A lack of internet access would 
stifle Americans’ ability to communicate, receive news transmissions, and access 
information.  Furthermore, a lack of internet access would interrupt or completely 
halt certain daily tasks. 
Given Americans’ strong dependence on the internet, the benefits of net 
neutrality are obvious.  Some of these benefits include gaining equal and open 
access to content, spurring innovation in the market without having to “pay to 
play,” protecting free speech, keeping content choices in the hands of consumers, 
and stimulating ISP competition to create better service for consumers.
166
 
The heart of the net neutrality debate is whether regulation should be used to 
achieve net neutrality goals.
167
  Opponents of regulation argue that FCC regulation 
is unnecessary because market forces are sufficient to punish anticompetitive ISP 
behavior.
168
  However, this argument is misguided.  
B.   Need for Continued Regulation 
Broadband internet needs strong regulation for the following four reasons.  
First, the market is not competitive enough to punish anticompetitive behavior.  
Second, consumers do not have access to the information needed to punish 
anticompetitive ISP behavior.  Third, net neutrality regulation successfully 
promotes the virtuous cycle which has increased access to and innovation of 
broadband.  Lastly, if the FCC does not commit to regulating broadband internet, 
consumers might pay for the use of internet and its applications separately, as seen 
Portugal, Spain, and New Zealand. 
1.   Lack of Competition 
Supporters of deregulation argue that there is enough competition to punish 
anticompetitive behavior by firms.
169
  History has shown that this argument is 
patently false.  In addition to the cases discussed above, there are numerous 
examples of ISPs blocking or degrading internet speeds for certain applications.
170
  
For example, from 2007 to 2009, AT&T “forced Apple to block Skype and other 
 
 165 See Carli Velocci, Internet Access Is Now a Basic Human Right, GIZMODO (July 4, 2016), 
https://gizmodo.com/internet-access-is-now-a-basic-human-right-1783081865.  
 166 See, e.g., BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 12, at 614. 
 167 Id. at 614–15. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See generally Timothy Karr, Net Neutrality Violations: A Brief History, FREE PRESS (Jan. 
24, 2018), https://www.freepress.net/blog/2017/04/25/net-neutrality-violations-brief-history. 
164 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 94:3 
competing VOIP phone services.”
171
  Consumers also caught ISPs engaging in 
similar behavior after the invention of the Google Voice application.
172
  In 2010, 
Windstream Communications, a DSL provider, intercepted toolbar search queries 
to block the Firefox toolbar and to enter its own search portal instead.
173
  In 2011, 
MetroPCS released its plan to block streaming video over its 4G network from all 
sites except YouTube.
174
  Furthermore, in 2011, the FCC discovered that several 
ISPs were intercepting customers’ search requests on Bing and Yahoo and 
redirecting them to different search engine pages.
175
  In 2012, AT&T blocked 
FaceTime for its customers unless they entered into specific data plans.
176
  Lastly, 
in 2014, Verizon throttled Netflix data, which occurred until Netflix paid for a 
streaming deal.
177
  These are just a handful of the many examples that illustrate 
that market forces are not strong enough to thwart ISPs’ anticompetitive behavior.  
Clearly, even with the current regulations, ISPs are powerful enough to 
continuously engage in anticompetitive behavior that is harmful to consumers.    
The FCC recently released data explaining the anticompetitive behavior of 
ISPs.  These 2016 statistics demonstrate that consumers in the United States still 
do not have a significant choice in high-speed broadband service providers: 39% 
of rural Americans do not even have access to the FCC’s defined standard 
broadband (25Mpbs/3Mpbs).
178
  Moreover, of the 61% of rural Americans who 
have broadband access, only 13% of Americans living in rural areas have more 
than one choice of providers, compared to 44% of Americans living in urban 
areas.
179




While these statistics are troubling, they do not provide the entire picture.  
The FCC Chairman, Jessica Rosenworcel, stated that the FCC’s threshold for 
broadband used in this study was too low.
181
  Rosenworcel argued that anything 
less than 100Mpbs would “shortchange our children, our future, and our digital 
economy.”
182
  If the study had implemented the Rosenworcel’s suggested 
threshold, the numbers would have shown drastically less competition and 
available coverage.
183
  Therefore, it is clear that consumers do not possess the 
market power to punish ISPs through changing providers when their ISP engages 
in anticompetitive behavior.  As such, it is imperative that the FCC continues to 
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regulate for net neutrality.  Without regulation, ISPs could raise rates, provide 
decreased levels of service, and block content without suffering repercussions for 
their behavior.  
2.   Lack of Requisite Information to Punish ISPs 
A lack of power in the broadband market is not the only hurdle consumers 
must face.  The current system also deprives consumers of essential information 
about their ISP’s behavior.
184
  There are only a few means by which consumers 
can determine if ISPs are acting in an anticompetitive manner, and they are time 
consuming and complicated.  Currently, consumers must run various “speed tests” 
to determine if their ISP is throttling, blocking, or discriminating against 
content.
185
  However, before consumers can run these speed tests, they must (1) 
restart their modem and router, (2) avoid using the internet for anything else, (3) 
restart their computer before testing, (4) clear their browser’s cache, and (5) 
choose a proper HTML5 test.
186
  This method is ineffective, confusing, and time 
consuming.  Moreover, this method does not provide consumers with a clear and 
accurate determination of whether their content had been interfered with.  
Therefore, consumers lack the power to make decisions about net neutrality 
regulation and choose ISP providers (in the rare circumstance there is a choice) 
because they lack the ability to be fully informed about their service quality.  This 
lack of information disenfranchises consumers and allows ISPs to degrade content 
without fear of punishment for their anticompetitive behavior.     
3.   Regulation Promotes the “Virtuous Cycle” 
Opponents of regulation argue that FCC regulation of broadband is ineffective 
in creating an internet system that is net neutral.  However, a recent study shows that 
the FCC’s regulations have been successful in promoting the “virtuous cycle,” which 
increases access to broadband internet.  The virtuous cycle suggests broadband 
providers “have both the incentive and the ability to . . . block access . . . [,] they can 
target competitors . . . and they can extract unfair tolls.”
187
  Regulation consistent 
with a net neutral internet can mitigate these incentives and spur the growth of 
broadband technology.
188
  Regulation promotes a virtuous cycle of innovation 
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whereby consumers’ demand for content and higher bandwidth speeds spurs 
expansion of broadband technology.
189
  
In June 2017, the National Cable Television Association released data that 
shows “the average speed of broadband connections has . . . continued to rise since 
the FCC first adopted net neutrality rules in 2010.”
190
  Furthermore, this data 
demonstrated that “the rate of increase has accelerated since the FCC adopted the 
Title II reclassification” and that “the cost of moving bits from [a] source to your 
home has dropped 90 percent on a per bit basis” since the FCC began enforcing net 
neutrality over a decade ago.
191
  This clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of recent 
regulations in promoting technological advances, thereby creating faster and more 
cost-effective services.  Therefore, not only is continued regulation imperative, as 
discussed above, but this regulation has also been highly successful.  Regulation that 
fosters this innovation is crucial to the United States ensuring internet access for 
low-income and rural households across the country.  
4.   A World Without Regulation 
Many arguments in the net neutrality debate fail to account for internet models 
of other countries when assessing the need for regulation in the United States.
192
  A 
troubling example of a system without strong net neutrality regulations is that of 
Portugal.  Portugal does very little in the way of regulating for a net neutral internet 
model and its consumers are paying the price.
193
  Under Portugal’s deregulated 
scheme, consumers have been subjected to feeding broadband providers’ business 
models and high prices.
194
  Customers purchase different service tiers of broadband 
that cap internet usage data at a certain point.
195
  On top of these packages, customers 
must pay to use common applications and services.
196
  This model is detrimental to 
the use of the internet because it drives up costs, creates barriers, and gives ISPs too 
much authority in choosing which internet services go under basic plans or add-on 
packages.  Systems such as Portugal’s result in a “rich and poor internet” scheme by 
which certain wealthy consumers can access more information over the internet than 
those who are economically less fortunate.
197
  This type of payment scheme raises 
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serious concerns about the availability of internet-based educational services to 
those in lower socioeconomic classes.  Furthermore, models such as Portugal’s stifle 
innovation and competition by favoring established companies, because the system 




Portugal is not the only country that has seen the harmful effects of inadequate 
net neutrality regulation; customers in both Spain and New Zealand suffer from 
similar pricing models.
199
  These examples clearly demonstrate the repercussions of 
internet industries that lack net neutrality.  As demonstrated above, the United 
States’ market and consumers are not equipped to sufficiently rein in harmful ISP 
behavior.  Therefore, continued regulation of net neutrality by the FCC is necessary 
to avoid pricing systems like those of Portugal, Spain, or New Zealand.  
C.   Proposed Changes  
In addition to continued FCC regulation, this Essay also argues for two changes 
to the 2015 Order to increase the FCC’s regulatory effectiveness.  First, to combat 
information dissymmetry between ISPs and consumers, the FCC should implement 
total transparency requirements for ISPs.  Under these new transparency 
requirements, the FCC would require ISPs to notify their consumers each time 
content was degraded, blocked, or throttled.  Regulations requiring greater 
transparency would help mitigate information dissymmetry between consumers and 
ISPs by giving consumers direct, real-time notifications of ISP degradation of 
content.  Moreover, increased transparency would empower consumers to pressure 
their ISPs to stop acting in anticompetitive ways by providing them with easily 
accessible information.  Furthermore, as competition increases between ISPs, and 
consumers gain more choices in providers, this information would help consumers 
make informed choices in selecting providers.  
The second change this Essay argues for is that the FCC start regulating 
interconnection agreements between ISPs.  In doing so, the FCC would be closing a 
regulatory loophole that has existed for far too long.  Many policymakers and net 
neutrality advocates have expressed concerns that “ISPs could use interconnection 
disputes to make an end-run around net neutrality restrictions.”
200
  Interconnection 
offers just as many incentives as other aspects of the industry for ISPs to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior, such as imposing exorbitant costs on networks or blocking 
networks altogether.
201
  As demonstrated above, the industry is not competitive 
enough to punish this behavior.  Therefore, to ensure effective net neutrality 
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regulation, the FCC should regulate this interconnection with the goal of closing the 
current regulatory gaps.  With these changes, the FCC can more effectively regulate 
broadband to ensure net neutrality.   
CONCLUSION  
As the current FCC administration deregulates the broadband industry, the net 
neutrality debate has become more important than ever.  This Essay has discussed 
the ways in which policy goals of this nature are misguided—the current policy 
overstates the power of competition in the market; underestimates ISPs intention to 
act in self-serving, anticompetitive ways; does not provide consumers with the tools 
they need to make informed decisions; and neglects to look at the grim realities of 
countries that have chosen to deregulate this industry.  Without continued regulation, 
the internet may become less accessible and more expensive, which in turn would 
stunt its technological growth.  Regardless of the outcome of the new FCC policies, 
the internet community should continue fighting for net neutrality regulations to 
protect the market from discrimination, blocking, throttling, and other 
anticompetitive behavior. 
